If scienti…c knowledge is a public good, why do …rms invest in research? This paper revisits this question with new data on patent citations to corporate scienti…c publications. Using data on 4,736 …rm for the period 1980-2006, we explore the relationship between the use of corporate research in invention and the output of corporate scienti…c publications. Our principal contribution is to document that corporate investment in research is closely related to its use in invention. Speci…cally, …rms that build on their scienti…c publications in their inventive activity invest more in research than those that are less successful in using their research internally. Consistent with this, research that is internally used is valued more and is more productive.
Introduction
Although scienti…c knowledge is considered to be the quintessential public good, for-pro…t companies have contributed signi…cantly to the production of scienti…c knowledge. In 2013, the business sector performed 24% of all basic research in the United States and funded a slightly larger share (NSF Science and Engineering Indicators, Table 4-3 2016) . However, the share of basic and applied research in total business R&D expenditures has steadily declined over the last two decades (Mowery, 1009; Arora et al, 2015) To understand the causes and implications of such a decline, it is important to understand why …rms invest in research in the …rst instance. In this paper, we use newly developed data linking patents to scienti…c publications matched to …rms to investigate this question. In particular, we empirically study the extent to which corporate engagement in research, as measured by scienti…c papers published by corporate researchers, is related to the use of the research in invention, as measured by citations received
We would like to thank Wes Cohen and Andrea Patacconi. All remaining errors are ours. y Duke University, Fuqua School of Business and NBER (ashish.arora@duke.edu) z Duke University, Fuqua School of Business (sharon.belenzon@duke.edu) x Duke University, Fuqua School of Business (lia.sheer@duke.edu) by scienti…c publications of the …rm from its own patents and from its rivals. 1 We …nd that …rms produce scienti…c knowledge when they are able to use the …ndings. Put di¤erently, scienti…c knowledge produced by …rms is an important input for the eventual development of new products and processes.
American corporate labs initially had more modest goals. In the late 19th century, …rms in technology intensive sectors such as railroads, steel, and telegraphy relied largely on external inventions. These …rms established industrial labs to evaluate the quality of inputs, such as the quality of steel for rails (Mowery, 1995; Carlson, 2013) . In the early 20th century, …rms such as AT&T, GE and DuPont invested in internal research to solve production problems and evaluate and adapt inventions acquired from other …rms (Reich, 1985; Hounshell and Smith, 1986) . Corporate investment in research became more signi…cant during the inter-war years, as corporations grew larger and more anxious to manage innovation instead of having to rely on the external inventions (Maclaurin, 1953) . Stronger anti-trust enforcement provided an additional impetus as some farsighted managers saw in research a source of new products to fuel growth without running afoul of the anti-trust authorities.
The importance of discoveries such as vacuum tubes, radar, radio, synthetic rubber, nuclear …ssion, and penicillin, in the conduct of World War II led to a deeper appreciation of the potential economic usefulness of research. The simplest view of the role of research in innovation was the so-called linear model associated with Bush (1945) , which asserted that technical progress rested upon scienti…c advance, that inventions grew out of research. This view was modi…ed and enriched in a variety of ways (e.g., Kline and Rosenberg, 1986 ; David, Mowery and Steinmueller, 1992) . However, the underlying notion that "... most of the actual research in industry is devoted to the development of new products or processes ... " (Griliches, 1986: 145) remained in place. Yet, because scienti…c discoveries are typically published and non-proprietary in nature (e.g., Dasgupta and David, 1994) , why …rms choose to invest in research themselves rather than free-ride on the research e¤orts by others remains unclear (Arrow, 1962; Rosenberg, 1990 ). This puzzle led to new explanations for why …rms invest in research. These explanations focused on absorptive capacity to use external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Gambardella, 1992) , enhancing reputation to attract investors and costumers (Hicks, 1995) and incentives for high-skilled inventors Stern, 2004; Gambardella et al., 2015) . The various explanations are not mutually exclusive, but can have very di¤erent normative and positive implications. Moreover, there has been no serious attempt to explore empirically the extent to which …rms produce scienti…c knowledge because it is relevant and useful for their own (downstream) inventions. 2 Much of the existing literature on innovation has tended to focus on either R&D as a whole, con ‡at-ing research and development, or patents, or knowledge and invention. 3 Data limitations are an obvious explanation. But insofar as technical advances draw upon scienti…c knowledge, understanding the production and use of science is important for both public policy and business strategy. Further, corporate investments in research have been a signi…cant share of overall investment in research, and understanding why …rms invest in research is useful not just for informing policy formulation but also for insights into how the economy itself is changing.
In this paper, we explicitly distinguish between research on the one hand, and downstream invention on the other. Our principal contribution is to document that corporate production of scienti…c knowledge is closely related to its use in internal invention. Speci…cally, …rms that are able to build on their research in their inventive activity produce more knowledge than those that are less successful in using their research internally. Consistent with this, research that is internally used is valued more by investors and internal use is associated with higher R&D productivity.
Our main methodological contribution is to match publication records from ISI Web of Science to front-page non-patent literature (NPL) references on a large scale. While previous research using patent citation data was mostly done for selected industries and years (e.g., Narin and Noma, 1985 2 We use publication output as a proxy measure of the …rm's investment in research. Implicitly, we are assuming that publication propensity is not changing over time. Though there are well documented instances of …rms emphasizing patents over publications (see Hegde and Bhaskarbhatla 2014 on IBM), our reading of the evidence is that reduction in publications were also associated with a reduction in investment in upstream research relative to downstream development activities. 3 Nelson (1959) was among the …rst to speci…cally analyze incentives to invest in research, as opposed to development. Griliches (1986) studied the returns to investment in research, as distinct from overall R&D. relationships controlling for unobserved di¤erences across …rms or sectors. We use publications as a measure of the production of new scienti…c knowledge and patents as a measure of inventive activity. We treat a citation by a patent to a corporate publication as an indicator that the invention used or built upon the knowledge represented by the publication. Internal use is measured as a citation by a patent to scienti…c publication produced by the same …rm. 4 The …rm behavior we analyze, namely the production and use of scienti…c knowledge by pro…t seeking companies, are complex. We are well aware that both the production and use of research are likely related to each other,potentially a¤ected by common variables, some of which are unobserved and likely vary across …rms and industries. We probe the robustness of the relationship between internal use and the production of scienti…c knowledge by using …rm-…xed e¤ects, by directly measuring organizational features that would help …rms use internally developed science, and …nally, by exploiting plausibly exogenous sources of variation in the extent of internal use.
The paper is organized as following. Section 2 discusses the related literature, Section 3 presents the data and empirical methodology, Section 4 presents the estimation results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Why do …rms invest in research?
Scienti…c knowledge as an input into invention
In 1945 Vannevar Bush spelled out what became known as the Linear Model: "Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scienti…c capital. It creates the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn. New products and new processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science." (p. 241) The linear model asserts a unidirectional link from science to technology development. 5 Not only do advances in technology sometimes happen without corresponding advances in science, 4 Citations to scienti…c publications and other types of non-patent literature are di¤erent from the citations to other patents. The latter constitute prior art and restrict the scope of the claimed invention. 5 In 1969, The US Department of Defense challenged the linear model in its "Hindsight Project", which studied the contributions of research to the development of major weapon systems. The result of the study showed that only 0.3% of innovation came from "undirected" scienti…c research (i.e., basic research). On the other hand, The National Science Foundation, conducted the "TRACES Research Project" and found that 70% of the key events in the development of …ve technological innovations (magnetic ferrites, the video tape recorder, oral contraceptives, the electron microscope, and matrix isolation) were "nonmission-oriented" (i.e., basic research). (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979) . sometimes to facilitate advances in science, by posing important puzzles, as well as by providing better tools for experimentation, measurement, and analysis (e.g., Gibbons and Johnston, 1975; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Narin, 1997) 6 . However, even if new products and processes are not mere outgrowths of research …ndings, research can be a useful input into invention. In a prescient analysis Nelson (1959) noted that even when inventions were not the direct result of scienti…c discoveries, scienti…c knowledge was valuable in guiding downstream development. David, Mowery and Steinmueller (1992) build upon this conception of scienti…c knowledge as a map for guiding downstream inventive activity. Fleming and Sorenson (2004) show that a patent that cites scienti…c publications receives more citations from future patents, especially when the focal patent is builds on highly inter-related components of knowledge, wherein trial-and-error is less e¢ cient. In other words, scienti…c knowledge can be both directly valuable (the linear model) or indirectly valuable, by increasing the e¢ ciency of downstream inventive activity.
Even so, it would still not imply that …rms should individually invest in research. Indeed, Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) noted that scienti…c knowledge is a public good. Well before that, American …rms such as AT&T, GE, and Du Pont had begun to invest in scienti…c research in the interwar years, and others followed suit after the war ended (Maclaurin, 1953) . Moreover, the …rms investing in research were apparently bene…ting from it. In a seminal study, Griliches (1986) used the National Science Foundation (NSF) R&D-Census match, containing information on R&D expenditures, sales, employment, and other detail for approximately 1000 largest manufacturing …rms from 1957 through 1977. He estimated a CobbDouglas production function, including basic research as a fraction of total R&D as a separate argument in addition to R&D stock, labor and capital. Griliches found a very large return to basic research…rms that spent a larger share of R&D on basic research were also more productive. 7 Since the results of basic research performed were typically published and shared, this raised the question of how …rms were 6 Gibbons and Johnson (1974) study the interaction between science and technology in the development of thirty inventions. They conclude that "it is apparent that the relationship between science and industrial technology is more complex than previously assumed by either scientists or economists; there exists a wide variety of potential forms of interaction. While this settles the issue of whether science contributes to technological innovation, and provides a justi…cation, at one level at least, for maintaining an e¤ective research capability, the very complexity of the relationship precludes simple calculations of the optimum size or distribution of the science budget." (Gibbons and Johnston, 1975 p. 241) 7 Mans…eld (1980) found that investment in basic research investment was related to productivity growth in US manufacturing industried between 1948-66, controlling for applied research and development. A similar relationship was found for a small sample of sixteen oil and chemical …rms. If so, this suggested that the social returns (at the industry level) were similar to the private returns (at the …rm level).
bene…ting from their investment in research? We review next the literature that attempted to answer this question.
Absorptive capacity
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) challenged the public good nature of research, arguing that accessing outside knowledge is costly and requires absorptive capacity, which in turn requires that …rms engage in R&D. Rosenberg (1990) also challenged the idea that existing knowledge, though in the public domain, was "on the shelf", available to all. Instead, he argued that …nding, evaluating, and using publicly available knowledge itself presupposed some prior knowledge. He argued therefore that …rms invest in research because, in part, basic research helps the company to stay up-to-date and identify scienti…c developments in its …eld as well as easily absorb external knowledge while …tting it to its own needs (Rosenberg 1990) . A vast literature has found evidence consistent with absorptive capacity. Using survey data, Levin et al. (1987) …nd that independent R&D was most e¤ective for learning about rival technology Gambardella (1992) shows that pharmaceutical …rms with better research capabilities, measured by number of publications, are able to exploit internal as well as external science more e¤ectively. Cockburn and Henderson (1998) , using data from the pharmaceuticals industry, suggest that …rms that want to take advantage of public research must invest in internal basic research as well as interact with public sector researchers.
Attracting talented inventors
Several studies have examined the role of corporate publications in attracting talented scientist-inventors. Hicks (1995) points out that one reason that companies not only perform research, but also publish results, is because publishing is an e¤ective tool to recruit scientists 8 . Henderson and Cockburn (1994) emphasize the importance of corporate publication as a reward system. Examining research programs of major pharmaceutical …rms they …nd that scientists that are promoted on the basis of their publications and reputation in the wider scienti…c community, generate more important patents. Some researchers may have a "taste for science" i.e., may be willing to accept industrial positions if allowed to spend some time on their own research and to publish it. Indeed, Stern (2004) …nds that scientist may be willing to accept 8 Cockburn and Henderson (1998) further suggest that participation in research "acts as a powerful recruiting tool, since the highest quality scientists in a …eld are often reluctant to work for private …rms if they will not be able to publish and thus maintain their personal scienti…c reputation". 20% lower wages in exchange for autonomy, such as time for conducting and publishing independent research. Sauermann and Cohen (2010) , study the relationship between industrial scientists'motives and their innovative activities, using survey data on PhD industrial scientists. They …nd that intellectual challenge and independence have the strongest (positive) relationship with innovative output, especially in upstream research activities. 9 
Signalling to consumers, investors, and regulators
Publications may also build a …rm's reputation with regulators or customers. For instance, Lichtenberg (1986) shows based on Compustat …rm data and defense-related federal procurement data that approximately half of the increase in private R&D investment between 1979 and 1984 was stimulated by increase in government demand. suggest that collaborative research with university scientists helps biotech …rms signal their quality to the investors. Based on more than 30 years of publication data from European …rms and the industry's productivity growth dispersion, Belenzon and Patacconi (2008) …nd that young …rms, in highly developed …nancial markets, have stronger incentives to publish, in order to signal to prospective investors. Azoulay (2002) …nds that prescriptions for anti-ulcer drugs respond to the publication by the drug manufacturer.
Back to basics: Scienti…c knowledge as an input
Although the arguments based on attracting researchers and signalling to outside stakeholders are plausible, they raise additional questions. For instance, why should a …rm want to attract researchers? Similarly, why should outsiders see publication as a measure of quality relevant to them? Put di¤erently, is investment in research similar to a peacock's tail, of no direct private value but helping the …rm stand out from its competitors or is there direct private value as well?
In this paper we show that inventive activity in …rms directly bene…ts from internally produced scienti…c knowledge. Firms that are able to build upon their research will invest in research, even though 9 Gambardella et al. (2015) emphasize the role of autonomy as an e¤ective incentive for knowledge workers. They develop a model that shows where the outcome and thus bene…ts for workers are uncertain. The allocation of decision rights over a project is an e¤ective tool to motivate and increase e¤orts of scientist employees. They provide an example of DuPont that failed to hire reputed scientist whose salarly demands exceeded the …rm's willingess to pay, and ended up recruiting the young Harvard scientist Wallace Carothers, by o¤ering him independent research opportunities in the company. In this case, substituting salary by independent research successfully led to the invention of the Nylon. Gans, Murray and Stern (2014) develop a theoretical model in which a …rm may allow researchers to publish because it lowers the wage cost, if it can e¤ectively use patents to prevent the knowledge disclosed from bene…ting rivals. the knowledge itself is published openly. A …rm may be able to move faster than its rivals in building upon its own research, some relevant details of the research …ndings may not be published, and many aspects remain tacit. In other words, consistent with Rosenberg (1990) and Cohen and Levinthal (1989) , though published knowledge is potentially available to all, some …rms may be better placed to use it, most notably the …rm that produced the knowledge in the …rst instance. This sets up the …rst part of the empirical analysis where we test whether citations by patents to publications produced by the patenting …rm are positively related to the …rm's production of scienti…c knowledge. In a supplementary analysis, we also document that R&D productivity (as measured by patent output per unit of R&D investment) is greater for …rms with greater internal use, controlling for the …rm's publication stock. 10 On the other hand, if rivals were able to use a …rm's research, this would lower the private return, and hence the private incentives to invest in research (Gans, Murray and Stern, 2013). Hence, if patents by rivals were to cite a …rm's publications, it would reduce the …rm's willingness to invest. Thus, a follow up analysis examines how incentives to invest are related to the external use of internal science. Because citations may also re ‡ect quality of the scienti…c output of the …rm, we distinguish between citations by patents of rivals from citations by other external patents. 11 We …nd that use of its research by rivals is associated with lower production of publication output by a …rm. These …ndings are mirrored by those for the implied value of publication stock. We estimate a Tobin Q regression which shows that the implied value of a …rm's publication stock is greater when the publications are cited by its own patents but lower when the publications are cited by rivals.
Finally, we explore the factors that condition internal use. One way in which a …rm is able to preferentially use its internal research is if the researchers are also involved in the invention process. 1 0 The various explanations for why …rms invest in research would all predict that invention productivity would be higher in …rms that invest in research. For instance, insofar as the …rm invests in research to attract talented inventors with a taste for science, one would also expect that talented inventors to also publish scienti…c articles, and for invention productivity to be higher in such …rms. The absorptive capacity view has similar predictions if one makes the auxiliary assumption that inventors that are active in research are better able to absorb external knowledge, and hence, are more productive. What is distinctive is whether this coupling between research and invention is based on the more e¢ cient use of internal knowledge or something else. The input view would imply that inventors would principally build on own their research. 1 1 The signalling explanation arguably has the opposite implication. Publication is merely the price of impressing customers and investors, or mollifying regulators. The more widely research is cited, the more compelling a signal it is. The attracting talented researcher explanation would also tend not to predict a negative relationship between external citations and the value of internal research, because researchers would also care about their reputation with peers working for rival …rms. The absorptive capacity explanation would imply no relationship between external use of internally generated science and the incentive to invest in science.
Such involvement might be helpful for aligning research priorities with downstream needs, help in the development of instruments, and generally facilitate the "back and forth" between the upstream research and the downstream development. We …nd the overlap between inventors and scientists of a …rm to be positively associated with internal use.
We also exploit variation across and within states in legal doctrines that plausibly a¤ect mobility of researchers, and therefore, are a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ability of …rms to build on internal research. A second source of variation in internal use arises from unexpected shocks to short-run pro…tability due to exchange rate movements. If investors (and hence, managers) are sensitive to shortrun pro…ts, the exchange rate movements that temporarily reduce pro…ts can shift the composition of innovation projects in favor of those with shorter time-horizons. Insofar as short-term innovation are less likely to build upon research, this will reduce the demand for internal research. Both of these analyses indicate that the association between the production of scienti…c knowledge and its internal use is unlikely to re ‡ect mere unobserved heterogeneity across …rms. Instead, …rms that expect to use the knowledge they produce are more likely to produce it.
Data
We combine data from three main sources: (i) company and accounting information from U.S. Compustat, Corporate publications. Similar to the method discussed in Arora et al. (2015) , to identify a …rm's participation in scienti…c research we match our sample …rms to the Web of Science database (previously known as ISI Web of Knowledge). We include articles from journals covered in the "Science Citation Index" and "Conference Proceedings Citation Index -Science", which exclude social sciences, arts and humanities articles. Using the a¢ liation …eld for each publications record, we identify 294,968 articles, published between 1980 and 2006, with at least one author employed by our sample of Compustat …rms, from more than 5000 di¤erent journals.
Patent citations to corporate science. The main methodological contribution of this paper is matching NPL citations to publications. Using all patents granted in the period 1980-2014 (including corporate and non-corporate patents), we perform a many-to-many match between each patent citation reference and the corporate publication data we identi…ed from ISI Web of Science (approximately 14 million citations and 300 thousand corporate publications), allowing for more than one publication to be matched to each citation (based on a proximity score method explained in Appendix B). Next, to exclude mismatches, we use a more detailed matching algorithm that is based on di¤erent sources of publication information: standardized authors'names, number of authors listed, article title, journal name and year of publication. The matching algorithms accounts for misspelling, unstructured text, incomplete references, and other issues that may cause mismatches. An example of a front-page patent reference to non-patent literature is given in Appendix A ( Figure A1 ). Finally, we perform extensive manual checks to con…rm matches. More details on publication and citation matching are included in Appendix B.
Following the above procedures, we obtain 266,361 citations to 50,494 corporate science publications (17% of corporate publications), by 151,412 citing patents. Of the cited publications, 79% publications only have only external citations (i.e., never internal cited) while 21% have internal citations.
Ownership structures. While the matching of patents and publications is done at the subsidiary level, to better capture the complexity of large …rms'innovative activities, which can typically be organized across subsidiaries (Arora et al., 2014), we aggregate to the ultimate-owner-parent-company level (UO) for our econometric analysis. For example, if a …rm's subsidiary publishes scienti…c articles while the parent company is the assignee registered on the …rm's patents, we capture both at the UO level. The construction of the …rm dataset presents several challenges. We detail the challenges of constructing the dataset as well the procedures we use to deal with them in Appendix B. 12 
Descriptive statistics and non-parametric evidence
Our main sample and variables are at the parent company-year level. Table A1 in Appendix A summarizes the de…nition and data source for each variable. Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for our main variables over the sample period, 1980-2006. Our sample includes a wide distribution of …rm sizes: market value ranging from 8 million dollars (10th percentile) to 3.2 billion dollars (90th percentile) and sales ranging from 2 million dollars (10th percentile) to 2 billion dollars (90th percentile). Table 2 presents statistics for the main citation variables used in the econometric analysis for publishing …rms. A total of 2,413 …rms (51 percent of our sample …rms) publish a scienti…c article at least once, 799 …rms receive at least one citation to their publications (an average of 8 internal and 21 external citations per year). 388 …rms make at least one citation to their own scienti…c publications (an average of 5.8 unique …rm publications cited per year) and 760 …rms receive at least one external citation to their publication (an average of 17 unique patents citing a …rm's publications per year) Table 3 presents mean comparison tests, within publishing …rms, for di¤erences in characteristics between …rms with high and low internal use of their own science. Firms with above average value share of internal citations appear to have a higher publication count (0.4 vs. 0.2) as well as higher patent count (0.6 vs. 0.5) per R&D dollar. We also …nd that higher use of own science is associated with greater R&D intensity (0.2 vs. 0.1) and more overlap between inventors teams and authors (based on patents where the inventor team includes at least one author of a corporate publication published by the …rm up to 3 years prior to the patent's grant year).
Insert Tables 1-3 here 
Is corporate research an input into invention?
We examine whether corporate publications are more or less likely to be cited by a patent relative to comparable university publications. University publication were identi…ed by matching a list of top 100 U.S. university names based on Shanghai Rankings to the a¢ liation …eld of each publications record. The sample includes publications from top universities that were covered in the "Science Citation Index" and In general, a corporate publication is approximately 3 times more likely to be cited by a patent than is a university publication. Later, in the econometric analysis, we present the within-journal-issue analyses that also account for changes in sample composition, but with the same basic result, namely that corporate publications are more highly cited by patents than are university publications. Figure 1B plots the cumulative distribution of patent citations received per publication, by corporate and university publications. We …nd that the distribution of patent citations for corporate publications …rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution for university publication (p-value for Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution equality test: p<0.001). In other words, for any citation level threshold, the share of corporate publications exceeding the threshold is higher than the corresponding share of university publications.
Insert Figure 1 from all patents. It shows that …rms whose publications are disproportionately cited by its patents (above the median share of internal citations) also publish at a higher rate (an average of 3 publications per …rm-year for low internal citation share versus an average of 28 publications for high internal citation share). Figure 2B shows that the way a …rm's science is used is also related to its stock market value: Tobin's Q is positively related to internal use of science. Firm's with low internal citation share have on average a Tobin's Q ratio of 11, while …rms with high internal share have a ratio of 12.5. These results are consistent with the view that corporate research is not merely useful for attracting talented researchers or signalling to investors or regulators but is also a valuable input for invention.
Insert Figure 2 here 4 Econometric analysis
The use of corporate research in invention
We begin our econometric analysis by comparing the contribution of corporate research and university research to invention. Table 4 presents OLS estimation results for the probability of a publication being cited by a patent, distinguishing between corporate and university publications. The sample comprises publications from top 100 U.S. universities and publications from our sample …rms that were published between 1980 and 2006. 13 The baseline results (Column 1) indicate that corporate research is more likely to be cited by patents than university research. The baseline probability of a publication being cited is only 2.5 percent. Evaluated at the sample mean, the probability that a corporate publication is cited by a patent is 11 percentage points higher than the corresponding probability for a university publication. This di¤erence implies that a corporate publication is …ve and half times more likely to be cited by a patent than a university publication.
Corporate and university publications might vary in terms of their scienti…c importance, which can a¤ect the likelihood that they are cited by a patent. Column 2 controls for publication importance using the number of citations the publication receives from other scienti…c publications. The number of citations received is normalized by average number of citations received by all publications appearing in the same year as the focal publication. Once we control for publication quality corporate publications become 13 percent points more likely to be cited by a patent relative to university patent. To mitigate concerns that the di¤erences in patent citations to corporate and university publications are driven by research …eld, Column 3 presents estimates from a within-journal speci…cation, where we compare patent citations to publications published in the same journal. The coe¢ cient estimate on corporate publication falls to half of the estimate in the speci…cation in Column 2, but remains statistically di¤erent from zero and large: Corporate publications are about three times more likely to be cited by patents than university publications published in the same journal. Column 4 restricts the sample of university publications to only those from the top ten US universities. The results in Column 4 indicate that corporate publications, controlling for number of citations and journal …xed-e¤ects, have on average 6.2 percentage points higher probability to be cited by patents than publications from the top ten universities. In Column 5, we further control for variations within journals over time, by comparing publications in the same issue of the same journal (about 300,000 journal-issues), with very little change in the results relative to those reported in Column 3.
We further checked whether our …ndings are associated with higher self-citations to own publications.
Column 6 excludes internal-citations of patents to own publications. Once we exclude self-citation, a corporate publication is 5.5 percentage points more likely to be cited, or about two and half times more, than a university publication. This reduction implies that the higher use of corporate research is partly driven by its internal use. One possible concern is that corporate publications are cited by lower quality patents than are university publications. Column 7 examines citations received from high quality patents -patents with above median number of citations received from other patents. The same pattern of results continues to hold for citations by high quality patents. Finally, Column 8 examines variation across technology …elds. The technology …eld classi…cation is based on the journal's subject category, and we interact …eld dummies with the corporate publication dummy. The results show that corporate publication are more likely to be cited than university publications in all technology …elds (e.g., for energy:
0.06 0.021 = 0.039).
In sum, our econometric analysis con…rms the …ndings from Figure 1 . Corporate publications are more likely to be cited by patents than publications from leading universities, even after controlling for journal-issue …xed e¤ects. Insofar as patent citations proxy the use of research in invention, these results strongly support the view that corporate research is an important input into invention. We also …nd that the higher citation rates are driven partly by self-citations. Internal use is an important factor conditioning whether …rms invest in research and thus we investigate internal use more fully next.
Insert Table 4 here
Internal use and publication output
Having shown that corporate science is an important input to invention, we turn next to examine how the way the …rm's research is used is associated with publication output. Our main interest is to estimate the relationship between the internal use of research and future investment in research. We measure internal use of research as patent citations to own science and investment in research as the number of academic publications authored by at least one corporate scientist. Our baseline speci…cation is as follows:
P ublications it is the number of publications by …rm i in year t. Self _cites it 1 is the number of patent citations made by …rm i's patents that were granted up to year t-1 (inclusive) to its own scienti…c publications published up to year t-1 (inclusive). Our choice of the temporal structure of internal citations aims at mitigating concerns that number of publications and internal citations are a¤ected by common temporal shocks (e.g., shocks to research opportunity that a¤ect both the number of publications and patents that build on science). Z it 1 is a vector of …rm-year controls, including citations-weighed patent stock, R&D stock, and sales. R&D stock is calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15 percent depreciation rate (Hall et al., 2005) . So the R&D stock, GRD, in year t is GRD t = R t + (1 )GRD t 1 where R t is the R&D expenditure in year t and = 0:15. Patent stock in year t is P atent stock t = P at t + (1 )P atent stock t 1 where P at t is the number of patents in year t, i and t are complete sets of …rm and year dummies, and it is an iid error term. All speci…cations include a dummy variable for …rm-year observations with zero publications. Column 3 introduces …rm …xed-e¤ects into the speci…cation. The coe¢ cient estimate on internal citation falls sharply from 10.4 to 1.6, indicating the relationship between internal citations and publication output is driven to a large extent by heterogeneity across …rms. However, the within-…rm coe¢ cient estimate on internal citation remains statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level. The estimate implies that a one percent increase in internal citation is associated with about 1.6 percent increase in publication per year. Column 4 further restricts the sample to …rms that publish, yielding a very small decline in the estimated coe¢ cient of internal citations. Using the share of internal citations in total citations received by the …rm's publications as a measure of internal use, as in Column 5, yields a similar relationship.
Insert Table 5 here
Knowledge spillovers and publication output
If …rms invest in research as an input into internal inventive activity, then the use of that research by rivals would lower the return to such investments. We therefore investigate how investment is research is related to external citations -citations by outsiders to research by the focal …rm.
Column 1 in Table 6 adds external citations to the focal-…rm's publications to the speci…cation in Column 3, Table 5 . If the use of research by outsiders reduces the potential pro…ts created by the research, private returns to research should be reduced by its outside use (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Rosenberg, 1990) . Our …ndings are consistent with this prediction. Column 1 presents a negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient estimate on external citations. Based on this estimate, a 10 percent increase in external citation is associated with a 1.3 percent reduction in publication. The coe¢ cient estimate on internal citations remains robust and similar in size to the estimate obtained from the within…rm speci…cation in Table 5 , Column3.
Not all citations represent pro…t-reducing spillovers. Indeed, citations from patents of …rms that do not compete with the focal …rm in the product market will not reduce the returns to the …rm's investments in research, and may also re ‡ect unobserved di¤erences in the usefulness of the research …ndings. We build on Bloom et al. (2013) and Ja¤e (1988), to construct SEGMENT and TECH, as empirical measures of how close the citing …rm is to the cited …rm in the product space and technology space, respectively. any pair of …rms. Product market distance is measured analogously using SIC segments instead of IPC classes. 14 The correlation between SEGMENT and TECH proximity for the pairs of citing and cited companies in our sample is 0.0198, indicating that the measures proxy for di¤erent underlying variables.
We compute external citation counts weighted by the SEGMENT and TECH proximity of the citing and cited companies.
Column 2 in Table 6 reports external citation count to a …rm's own research separately weighted by SEGMENT and TECH proximity. While the coe¢ cient for external citations weighted by TECH proximity is statistically zero, the estimate for external citation weighted by SEGMENT proximity is negative and statistically signi…cant. The coe¢ cient estimate on SEGMENT proximity indicates that a 10 percent increase in external citation by product market rivals is associated with a similar percent reduction in publication. The coe¢ cient estimate on internal citation stock remains positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Results are even stronger when conditioning the sample on …rms that publish: a 10 percent increase in external citations by product market rivals is associated with a 12 percent reduction in publication (Column 3). These results suggest that investment in research is negatively related to its use by rivals in downstream product markets.
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the notion that a …rm's investment in research depends, among other things, on how the research is used, both internally and externally. Speci…cally, a …rm whose research is used in its own inventive activity is likely to continue investing in research.
However, a …rm whose research spills over to rivals is likely to reduce its investment. Furthermore, the 1 4 The SEGMENT proximity is computed based on the absolute un-centered correlation distance between publication-cited …rms and corporate patent-citing …rm's sales share distribution across line of business listed within the Compustat operating segments database:
where "x jl " denotes the share of sales of …rm j in segment l:The measure ranges from zero (least correlated) to 1 (fully correlated). Similarly, the TECH proximity is computed based on each …rm's patent share distribution across di¤erent technology …elds (i.e., IPC). More details on the SEGMENT and TECH measures are included in Appendix B.
observed pattern of result is broad-based, and not driven by any particular industry 15 .
Insert Table 6 here 4.4 Internal use and patent production A more conventional method of demonstrating that research is a direct input into internal inventive activity inside …rms is by estimating a patent production function as a function of R&D stock. All explanations for why …rms invest in research would predict that research would increase inventive output, all else held constant. However, if research is a direct input into invention, then a distinctive prediction is that inventive output would be greater with greater internal use.
In Table 7 we use the annual ‡ow of patents produced over the sample period , weighted by the citations each patent received up to 2014, as a function of the lagged R&D stock. Following standard practice, we take natural logs of both variables. We use the ratio of citations received from own patents to citations received from all patents as a measure of internal use. Column 1 and 2 con…rm that investment in R&D is positively related to inventive output. The within-…rm speci…cation (Column 2) indicates that a 10 percent increase in R&D stock is associated with 1.6 percent increase in citation-weighted patents.
In Columns 3-4 we interact R&D stock with share of internal citation. In Column 3 we control for unobserved heterogeneity by using …rm and year …xed e¤ects and …nd that R&D is more productive when internal use is higher. The coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between R&D stock and internal citation share is positive and statistically signi…cant. The estimate implies that for a two standard deviation increase in internal citation share, the elasticity of patent ‡ow with respect to R&D stock increased by approximately 17% (relative to the mean). In Column 4 we receive similar results for the set of …rms with at least one publication.
These results are consistent with earlier …ndings that internal use is associated with more investment in research. They indicate that one possible mechanism is that internal use implies a greater productivity of R&D investment as measured by the number of citation-weighted patents produced for a given level 1 5 Tables A3 explores how the above pattern of results varies across main industries. Appendix A2 includes a list of all four-digit SIC codes that fall in each industry. Overall, we …nd that the results reported in Table 6 are present in most industries except for pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, where we have an insigni…cant coe¢ cient for internal citation and a statistically signi…cant positive coe¢ cient for external citations to own science. The positive coe¢ cient on internal citation is the highest for Machinery & equipment …rms.
of R&D. In turn, this suggests that internal research either directly leads to inventions or indirectly by improving the focus of inventive e¤orts. In either case, the research is acknowledged in citations by the resulting patents. Firms that are able to use this research should generate more (or better quality) patents from a given R&D investment.
Insert Table 7 here 4.5 Internal use and stock market value If, as we have argued, internal use increases the return to investment in research, whereas spillovers to rivals reduces such returns, this should be re ‡ected not only in the level of publication output, but also its value. We therefore examine next the relationship between use of research and …rm stock market value.
Following Griliches (1986) and Hall et al. (2005), we estimate the following speci…cation:
In equation (2), market value is de…ned as the sum of the values of common stock, preferred stock, and total debt net of current assets. The book value of capital includes net plant, property and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles other than R&D. The dependent variable is the natural log of Tobin's Q, de…ned as the ratio of enterprise value to assets. Z is a vector of controls including lagged R&D over assets and patent stock over assets. Table 8 presents the estimation results. The coe¢ cient estimates in such a regression are amenable to di¤erent interpretations. We interpret these coe¢ cients as re ‡ecting the imputed value attributable to the relevant asset, or a "shadow price" of the asset (Hall et al., 2005) . Column 1 in Table 8 includes 327 four-digit industry dummies (…xed e¤ects) and columns 2-5 include …rm …xed e¤ects instead of industry …xed e¤ects. Consistent with the results reported in Tables 5, 6 and 7, Column 1 and 2 of Table 8 indicate that internal citation to own publications is associated with a higher "shadow price" of publication stock.
The within-…rm estimate of the coe¢ cient on internal citation stock (Column 2) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in internal citation stock to assets is associated with a 4% increase in Tobin's Q.
Column 3, adds external cites (citations by external patents to the …rm's publications) to the speci…ca-tion. While the coe¢ cient estimate on internal citation stock remains positive and statistically signi…cant at 1% level, we …nd a positive and signi…cant e¤ect for external use of corporate research on its value.
Column 4 shows that for …rms with at least one publication the coe¢ cient on external citation drops in size and statistical signi…cance. The coe¢ cient on internal citations remains large and statistically signi…cant. Columns 5 distinguishes citations received from rivals in product markets and those from other …rms in the same technical domains. Column 5 indicates, similar to the …ndings in Table 6 , that stock market value is negatively related to its external use by product market rivals. The coe¢ cient estimate indicates that a one standard deviation increase in segment weighted external citation stock to assets is associated with a 8% decrease in Tobin's Q. In sum, internal use of research is associated with higher value whereas research that is used externally is less valuable.
Insert Table 8 Various factors determine the extent to which the ‡ow of scienti…c knowledge produced by the …rm is used in its downstream activities. One is how broad and far-ranging the …rm's search for innovations is.
Incremental improvements in existing products are less likely to use science than ones advanced beyond the existing technological frontier. In other words, one determinant of the use of internal science is simply the use of science in general. Factors that shorten the time horizon of managers will reduce use of science in general and internal use in particular. If line managers, responsible for choosing between incremental and radical innovations, respond to temporary declines in pro…tability by cutting back on longer horizon and uncertain exploratory projects, the derived demand for internal science will be lower. Such shorttermism has been extensively documented in the …nance literature as a response to the importance of meeting earning targets in publicly traded …rms (Graham et al., 2004 ). This suggests the use of shocks to short-term pro…tability as a source of exogenous variation in internal use of science.
Internally produced scienti…c knowledge is more likely to be used if it is of high quality and aligned to the innovation strategy of the …rm. 16 Alignment is di¢ cult to achieve because it is di¢ cult to determine and then ensure scientists undertake research that will produce knowledge that is useful for the …rm.
Scientists may take time to learn about the …rm's needs, and their professional and intellectual interests may push them towards research more likely to make a splash rather than useful to the …rm. Longer tenure for scientists can help align incentives and also help them understand what types of knowledge is useful to the …rm. Legal restraints of labor mobility, which make it easier for …rms to hold on to valuable researchers We use variation over time in the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) status at the state-year level as a second source of exogenous variation in internal use.
A third determinant is related to the internal organization of R&D. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) argued that innovation rarely proceeds linearly from knowledge creation to invention. Rather, innovations often require a "back-and-forth" between downstream invention and development activities and the more upstream research. As Rosenberg (1990 Rosenberg ( :1970 put it: "When basic research in industry is isolated from the rest of the …rm, whether organizationally or geographically, it is likely to become sterile and unproductive. The history of basic research in industry suggests that it is likely to be most e¤ ective when it is highly interactive with the work, or the concerns of applied scientists and engineers." This suggests that organizational overlap between inventors and researchers should be associated with greater internal use.
We compute a measure of overlap patent share as the share of patents per year where the inventor team includes at least one author of a publication (published by the …rm) in the three years prior to the patent's grant year. Naturally, overlap patent share is only de…ned for …rms with at least one publication. 17 Table 9 presents OLS estimation results for the relationship between overlap patent share and internal and external citation to research. In Columns 1-2 we estimate a linear probability model in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the …rm receives at least one internal citation in the focal year to any of its publication published up to the focal year and zero otherwise. Column 1 includes four-digit industry …xed e¤ects and Column 2 includes …rm …xed e¤ects. The results in Column 1 and 2 indicate a higher probability of a publication being internally cited for higher overlap patent shares. Column 1 indicates that a two standard deviation increase in overlap patent share will increase the probability of internal citation by 8 percentage points. The within-…rm estimate of the coe¢ cient on overlap patent share (Column 2), falls by approximately 50% compared to the speci…cation in Column 1, but remains statistically di¤erent from zero and meaningful.
Organizational overlap between research and invention
In Column 3 the dependent variable is a dummy for at least one external citation in the focal year to the …rm's prior publications. The coe¢ cient on overlap patent share is negative, indicating that there is a negative relationship between overlap of inventor and research teams within the …rm and external citations to the …rm's publications.
For Columns 4 and 5 we use a speci…cation where the dependent variable is internal citation share with industry and …rm …xed e¤ects, respectively. We …nd that results also hold with this alternative at 1% level. As a robustness check, in Column 6 we compute internal citation share including only citations to publications up to …ve years old. The coe¢ cient estimate on overlap patent share remains robust and is even bigger in size compared to the estimate obtained from the complete sample (an estimate of 0.047 versus 0.038 for the complete sample). This is reassuring because our measure of overlap is based on an inventor authoring a corporate publication in the preceding three years. Therefore, con…ning attention to internal patent citations to more recent publications should result in a larger estimate, as is indeed the case.
In column 7, the analysis is at the level of the patent. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a given patent cites an internal publication as a function of whether at least one of the inventors of that patent authored a corporate publication in the preceding three years. Even after controlling for the stock of publications and …rm-…xed-e¤ects, we …nd that the probability of an internal citation by a patent is positively related to the overlap between inventors and researchers. We conclude that a tight relationship between the research and invention teams is positively related to the internal use of a …rm's science in its inventions.
Insert Table 9 here
Instrumental variable estimation
A possible concern with the results presented thus far is that the ability to use research internally as well as investment in research are both driven by a common unobserved variables. We have presented results using …rm-…xed e¤ects to mitigate concerns that these unobserved variables are persistent …rm speci…c ones, such as di¤erences in the quality of researchers. We now turn to estimates using two sources of exogenous variation to mitigate concerns about biases induced by time varying sources of unobserved heterogeneity, such as unobserved di¤erences in demand or changes in technical opportunity. The IV estimation is motivated by more than a desire for causal estimates. Rather, each instrument is related to a potential determinant of internal use. In other words, although we cannot do justice to the issue, the analysis that follows also points to a mechanism linking the external environment of the …rm and its use of internally generated science.
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Our …rst instrument exploits variation over time and across states in the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine ). 18 Lower mobility should lead to longer tenures for scientists and inventors. In turn, longer tenures should improve alignment between research and invention activities. Lower mobility should also improve information ‡ows between research and downstream activities. In particular, a …rm would be in a better position to use its own research if it learns of promising …ndings earlier than rivals. A …rm would also be in a better position to capitalize on its own research if some aspects of the research …ndings are tacit, and most easily transmitted through face-to-face interactions.
The identifying assumption is that policy imposed barriers to researcher mobility do not directly a¤ect incentives to invest in research, such as by a¤ecting wages of researchers. Further, one has to assume that the adoption of IDD is uncorrelated with unobserved state-speci…c variables that may also a¤ect 1 8 IDD e¤ective years for relevant states, based on Klasa, Sandy, et al. (2015) , are presented in appendix A4. The relevant state for each …rm-year is determined using the majority publishing-state in each cohort (1985-1995 and 1996-2006) , based on the publication's "Address" …eld. Example of …rm-year observations in our sample with e¤ective IDD: MA (4,246 obs.), MN (2,292 obs.), WA (1058 obs.), NC (946 obs.). The correlation between internal citations (of pubs up to 5 years old) and dummy for e¤ective IDD in the previous year is 0.03. incentives to invest in research.
For this analysis, the sample is conditioned on at least one publication and internal citations include only citations made to recent publications (up to …ve years old), under the assumption that we are interested in publications of current workers who are a¤ected by the IDD status. The dummy variable, IDD, is equal to one if the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine was e¤ective in the state in that year. We control for state level employment, based on U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), to capture state characteristic that may have in ‡uenced the outcome independently of the IDD status. Table 10 In sum, instrumenting for internal use of research using policy induced variation in employee mobility yields coe¢ cient estimates similar to those with …rm-…xed-e¤ects. These results are consistent with the view that …rms that are able to use their research to produce inventions are more likely to invest in research.
Insert Table 10 here 4.7.2 Pro…t shocks due to exchange rate ‡uctuations A di¤erent source of variation in internal use arises from changes in the mix of downstream innovation activities. Whereas incremental innovation is less likely to use science, including internally generated science, exploratory innovation is more likely to build on scienti…c advances and be guided by them.
Exploration has more uncertain outcomes and is less likely during lean times. Put di¤erently, exploratory innovation requires …nancial slack, because "slack provides a source of funds for innovations that would not be approved in the case of scarcity" (Cyert and March, 1963 We exploit …nancial shocks using foreign currency devaluations for export-oriented American …rms.
When dollar-denominated pro…ts drop due to a stronger US dollar (USD), …rms would engage in more exploitation and less exploration. Assuming that exploitation builds less on science, we expect less internal use of research (that is, patent citations to own science) as …rm patents become more exploitative and less exploratory. The main idea is that exchange rates a¤ect pro…ts of …rms with foreign subsidiaries, and pro…ts in turn a¤ect the decision of …rms to exploit science. Our identifying assumption is that short-term pro…t shocks a¤ect the decision of …rms to use science, but short-term pro…t shock does not a¤ect the value of scienti…c research independently from its e¤ect of the use of research. Speci…cally, we assume that (i) the future pro…ts depend upon the realized level of exchange rates, so that conditioning on current exchange rates, the long run value of research is una¤ected for a given level of internal use, and (ii) shocks to exchange rates lead to changes in internal use. We demonstrate that negative shocks to exchange rates lead to decreases in pro…tability and that negative exchange rate shocks shift downstream innovation away from exploration and towards exploitation, as re ‡ected in reduced patent citations to all science. We assume that this will also reduce internal use of the …rm's own science.
Our instrument uses the yearly change in foreign exchange rates weighted by …rm-speci…c weights.
We use two sets of weights: (i) foreign subsidiaries by …rm i in each country and (ii) the industry-level export of goods between the US and each foreign country in the main industry of …rm i. We include only manufacturing …rms . The data are for the years 1990-2006, which allows us to include subsidiaries in former USSR countries. The weighted change in exchange rates is computed as: e lag d by two periods as our instrument for one-period lagged internal use. Using both IVs produces similar estimates of the e¤ect of internal use on publications (1.4 when both IVs are used, as compared to 2 and 1.4 when IDD and devaluation are used separately, respectively). 22 The 2 2 The IV procedure returns a higher point estimate, 1.4, for the coe¢ cient on internal citations, as compared to the OLS Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions is consistent with the instruments being valid; we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated speci…cation (p-value for overidentifying restrictions=0.44, Hansen J statistic=0.59).
Insert Table 11 here
Conclusion
Using data on 4,736 publicly traded American …rms over the period 1980-2006, this paper studies the relationship between the use of corporate science and investment in research. We systematically match all NPL (non-patent literature) references to publication records from ISI Web of Science to learn about the use of science in research. We make three main contributions. First, we demonstrate that corporate research is useful for invention as it is more likely to be cited by a patent relative to the comparable university publication. Second, we show that internal and external use of science in invention is related to investment in research. Research that is used internally is valuable and …rms able to use their research produce more of it. Conversely, research used by rivals reduces value and …rms publish less when their research spills over to rivals. Third, we explore determinants of internal use of research. We show how overlap between research and invention teams within the …rm explains variation in the use of own science as an input to technology. We study di¤erences in labor market mobility, and in exploratory versus exploitative innovation activity as exogenous factors that a¤ect internal use. We exploit these as sources of exogenous variation to estimate the causal link between internal use and scienti…c publications by the …rm. Our …ndings advance our understanding of why …rms invest in research and the mechanism by which private returns to corporate science are realized. Our …ndings support the view, as captured by the knowledge production function, that …rms invest in research because the scienti…c knowledge produced is a useful input for the technologies they develop.
coe¢ cient of 0.9. If the OLS estimates were biased due to unobserved common shocks (such as some …rms being more likely to produce technically useful scienti…c discoveries), one would expect upward biased estimates. IV estimates should therefore produce lower point estimates. If, instead, internal citation is a noisy measure of internal use, IV estimates may produce higher point estimates. Though the samples are somewhat di¤erent, making comparisons hazardous, the point estimates reported in Column 11, Table 11 are very similar to the OLS estimates with …rm-…xed e¤ects reported in Table 5 , Column 4 (for publishing …rms). . Share of Internal citations to science is defined as ratio of self-citations from own patents to internal and external citations received by corporate and non-corporate patents, per year (averaged per firm). High and low internal share of citations are defined by above and below the median value of average per firm internal share of citations, respectively. Average publication count is defined as publications per firm-year, averaged per firm. Figure 2B restricts the sample to firms with above mean publication stock. Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of market value to assets and is averaged per firm. The sample is conditional on at least one citation to the firm's own science over the sample period. The sample for all publication variables is restricted to publishing firms. Inventor-author overlap is the share of non-collaborative patents per firm-year where the inventor team includes at least one author of a corporate publication published by the firm up to 3 years prior to the patent's grant year. For Inventor-author overlap, the sample is conditional on at least one publication stock and on firm-years with granted non-collaborative patents.
(1) Notes: This table presents the estimation results of a Linear Probability Model of the probability that a publication is ever cited by a patent for publications by corporations and by universities. The sample includes all publications of our sample firms and all publications by top100 research universities, published over the sample period and covered in Web of Science "Science Citation Index" and "Conference Proceedings Citation Index-Science". Patent citations are by patents granted between 1980 and 2014. The unit of observation is the publication. Corporate publication dummy is equal to one for articles with at least one author employed by our sample of Compustat firms. The dependent variable, dummy for citation by a patent, is equal to one if a publication has at least one patent citation. Column 4 restricts the samples to university publications from top 10 U.S. universities based on ShanghaiRanking's. Column 6 excludes selfcitation of patents to own publications. High quality patents (Column 7) includes all patents with above median citations compared to their grant year cohort. Industry classification (Column 8) is based on the journal's subject category. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Internal cites to own publications include patent citations up to year t-1 to publications published up to the same year. All specifications include a dummy variable that receives the value of one for firms that never published up to the focal year. Internal citation variable is divided by 100 and presented in log value. Column 2 averages variables at the firm level and performs a cross section analysis. In Columns 5-6 the sample is conditional on firms with below and above median average sales, respectively. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. Notes: This table presents OLS estimation results for the relationship between external citations and publications. External cites to own publications include corporate and non-corporate patent citations. Segment and TECH measure the product market proximity and the technology market proximity, respectively. All specifications include dummy variable that receives the value of one for firms that never published up to the focal year. All citation variables are divided by 100 and presented in log value. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms.
(1) 
Internal Citation Share
Notes: This table presents OLS estimation results for the relationship between author-inventor overlap and internal and external citation to science. Columns 1-6 are at the firm-year level. Dummy for internal (external) citation is equal to one if the firm receives at least 1 internal (external) citation at the focal year to any of its publication published up to the focal year. Internal citations share is defined as ratio of self-citations from own patents to internal and external citations received by all patents (corporate and non-corporate patents). Inventor-author overlap is measured by the share of non-collaborative patents per firm-year where the inventor team includes at least one author of a corporate publication published by the firm up to 3 years prior to the patent's grant year. Column 6 includes only citations to publications up to five years old. The sample is conditional on at least one publication stock and on firm-years with patents. Column 7 is at the patent level and is restricted to all non-collaborative patents of our sample firms granted between 1980 and 2006. Dummy for self-citing patent, equals one for patents that self-cite corporate science. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. Notes: This table presents instrumental variable estimation results for the effect of patent citations to own science on firm's future publication, for the period 1990-2006. The sample includes firms with at least one publication stock, out of which 1,007 firms have foreign subsidiaries. The endogenous variable, internal citation in year t-1, is instrumented at the firm-year level by a devaluation dummy that is based on weighted changes in exchange rates in countries where the firm has subsidiaries. Profit is measured by EBIDTA. NPL citations are cites in year t by the focal firm's patents to any Web of Science article. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. External citations to firm's own publications Annual flow of external patent citations to firm's i publications. Includes citations by corporate and non-corporate patents.
PatStat database and citation match for patents granted at the focal year and publications published from 1980 until the focal year.
External citations to firm's own publications, Segment
Annual flow of external patent citations to firm's i publications, weighted by product market proximity of the citing and cited firms. Product market proximity is computed based on each firm's sales share distribution across line of business listed within the Compustat operating segments database.
Compustat operating segments database, PatStat database and citation match for patents granted at the focal year and publications published from 1980 until the focal year.
External citations to firm's own publications, TECH Annual flow of external patent citations to firm's i publications, weighted by technology market proximity of the citing and cited firms. Technology market proximity is computed based on each firm's patent share distribution across different technology fields.
Share of internal citations
Share of internal citations to science is defined as ratio of self-citations from own patents to internal and external citations received by corporate and non-corporate patents, per year.
Inventor-author overlap
The share of patents per firm-year, for which the inventor team includes at least one author of a corporate publication published by the firm up to 3 years prior to the patent's grant year. 
Market value
Following Griliches (1981) , market value per firm-year is defined as the sum of the values of common stock, preferred stock, and total debt net of current assets. Tobin's-Q is defined as the ratio of market value to assets. U.S. Compustat R&D stock R&D stock per firm-year is calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15 percent depreciation rate (Hall et al., 2005) , such that the R&D stock, GRD, in year t is GRD t =R t +(1-δ)GRD t-1 where R t is the focal firm's R&D expenditure in year t based on Compustat data and δ=0.15.
U.S. Compustat Assets
The book value of capital includes net plant, property and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles other than R&D. U.S. Compustat Notes: This table presents OLS estimation results for the relationship between internal and external citations to firm's own science and production of publications, by industry. Industry classification is based on four-digit main SIC code. Publication count is per year t. Patent citation count variables are lagged by 1 year and include citations to publications that were published up to that year. External cites to own publications include corporate and non-corporate patent citations. All citations variables are divided by 100 and presented in log value. All specifications include dummy variable that receives the value of one for firms that never published up to the focal year. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms.
